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I. INTRODUCTION 
The case of Warren Summerlin, a man convicted of first-degree murder 
and sentenced to death in Arizona,1 demonstrates how numerous, fundamental 
errors—not egregious culpability—can lead to ultimate punishment.2 
Fortunately, Warren’s death sentence was vacated.3 Unfortunately, and more 
importantly when considering the integrity of the criminal justice system as a 
whole, no federal court ever granted Warren’s petitions for the writ of habeas 
corpus despite the obvious errors that plagued his trial.4 
Habeas corpus petitions request a federal court to review the legality of a 
person’s sentence.5 On a purely abstract level, if a petitioner can show that her 
imprisonment violates the United States Constitution or some federal law or 
treaty, relief should be granted.6 Overly simplifying the issue, if habeas relief 
is granted, the petitioner is released from official custody.7 
Habeas corpus petitions consist of various discrete claims that allege a 
petitioner’s rights established by the federal constitution or federal law have 
been or are being violated by her imprisonment.8 One particular claim stands 
apart because of its inefficacy: cumulative error claims.9 
Cumulative error claims allege that a petitioner’s due process right to a 
fundamentally fair trial was violated because of the aggregate effect of 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1088–91 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev’d sub 
nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004). According to the record, Summerlin 
sexually assaulted and killed Brenna Bailey, a delinquent account investigator. Id. at 1085. 
 2 See Justin F. Marceau, Exploring the Intersection of Effectiveness & Autonomy in 
Capital Sentencing, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 183, 197–200 (2006). 
 3 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084, 1121. It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling to this end was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 
U.S. 348, 358 (2004). However, after several subsequent appeals and other developments, 
the prosecution ultimately abandoned its pursuit of putting Warren to death. See State v. 
Summerlin, No. 1 CA-CR 09-0074, 2009 WL 3116831, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 
2009); see also Michael Kiefer, Arizona Murderer No Longer on Death Row, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (Dec. 22, 2008), http://archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/ 
2008/12/22/20081222deathpenalty1222.html [http://perma.cc/FP9S-UKE8]. 
 4 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084, 1121. 
 5 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: 
A BRIEF LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 
37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 748 (1987). 
 6 See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 748–49. The situation is much more complicated 
in light of modern developments in federal habeas law. DOYLE, supra note 5, at 5. See 
generally infra Part II. 
 7 See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 761. Notably, if a petitioner is granted habeas 
relief for one convicted charge, but not others, she will remain in official custody and will 
simply have the sentence for the charge upon which relief was granted vacated. See, e.g., 
Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 226 F.3d 696, 715 (6th Cir. 2000), aff’g in part, vacating in part 
999 F. Supp. 1073 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). 
 8 See infra Part II.A–B. 
 9 See infra Part II.C. 
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multiple errors.10 A petitioner raising a cumulative error claim effectively 
seeks the federal court’s review of all the potential or actual errors that 
transpired during the course of her state criminal proceedings and asks that 
court to determine if the net effect of all those errors rendered those 
proceedings fundamentally unfair.11 
On their face, cumulative error claims are ideal error-detection 
mechanisms.12 Rather than relying on the power of a single violation, 
cumulative error claims request that a federal court ensures numerous errors 
did not collectively undermine the constitutional legitimacy of a petitioner’s 
state criminal proceedings.13 In this way, they are essential tools to capital 
habeas petitioners attempting to prevent unfair trials from condemning them. 
However, federal courts never grant habeas relief on cumulative error claims 
alone, even in the capital context.14 
The marked impotence of cumulative error claims is not a product of 
universally fair and error-free state criminal procedures; it is the necessary 
result of vague historical precedent and increasingly restrictive federal law.15 
This dichotomy is all the more troubling in light of evidence that suggests at 
least some petitioners ought to be granted habeas relief based on the 
compound effect of the errors in their cases.16 To illustrate this point, consider 
the following brief recap of the missteps in Warren Summerlin’s state trial.17 
Judge Sidney R. Thomas, who drafted the opinion in Summerlin, described 
the case like this: 
It is the raw material from which legal fiction is forged: A vicious 
murder, an anonymous psychic tip, a romantic encounter that jeopardized a 
plea agreement, an allegedly incompetent defense, and a death sentence 
imposed by a purportedly drug-addled judge. But, as Mark Twain observed, 
“truth is often stranger than fiction because fiction has to make sense.”18 
First and foremost, Warren suffered from severe mental impairments, 
which undermined his capacity for self-awareness and self-control.19 Warren 
                                                                                                                     
 10 See Ruth A. Moyer, To Err Is Human; To Cumulate, Judicious: The Need for U.S. 
Supreme Court Guidance on Whether Federal Habeas Courts Reviewing State Convictions 
May Cumulatively Assess Strickland Errors, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 447, 463–66 (2013). 
 11 See infra Part II.C. 
 12 See infra Part IV. 
 13 See infra Part II.C. 
 14 See infra Part III. 
 15 See infra Part II.A–C. 
 16 See, e.g., Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1085–86, 1088–92 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(en banc), rev’d sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004).  
 17 Id.  
 18 Id. at 1084 (emphasis added). For another take on Warren’s case, see Marceau, 
supra note 2, at 197–200. 
 19 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1085–86. Warren suffered from a combination of 
intellectual disability and indications of organic brain impairment that caused him to be 
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had symptoms of psychomotor epilepsy that may have caused him to 
experience olfactory hallucinations.20 As a result, Warren may have 
experienced a “temporal lobe seizure” at the time of the killing.21 Despite the 
importance of this evidence, Warren’s trial attorney never presented any 
psychiatric evidence or called any mental health experts as witnesses.22 
Second, Warren’s original appointed counsel, referred to as “Jane Roe” by 
the Summerlin court,23 was sleeping with the attorney prosecuting him.24 
Despite the obvious conflict of interest this relationship created and Ms. Roe 
stating she “could no longer ethically represent” Warren, neither she nor the 
prosecutor felt it was necessary to disclose this issue to Warren.25 Further, 
neither Ms. Roe nor her office informed the court of this conflict or Ms. Roe’s 
belief that she was no longer capable of representing Warren.26 
Third, Warren’s second appointed counsel,27 a private practitioner named 
Mr. George Klink, did little to mount a defense for Warren and conducted 
virtually no mitigation investigation.28 Mr. Klink presented no evidence to 
support his defense theory at trial nor did he consult any psychiatric experts 
for trial or for sentencing.29 Mr. Klink did not even meet with Warren before 
                                                                                                                     
emotionally and mentally disturbed and prevented him from understanding his own 
motives underlying his behavior. Id. 
 20 Id. at 1085, 1094. 
 21 Id. at 1085. An electroencephalogram showed some evidence that Summerlin 
suffered from this form of epilepsy, but was insufficient to support a diagnosis. Id. 
 22 Id. at 1088. 
 23 Id. at 1085. 
 24 Id. at 1086–87. Initially, Ms. Roe did report her involvement with the prosecutor to 
her supervisor, but did not take any action to unilaterally withdraw, to inform Warren, or to 
inform the judge. Id. at 1087. Further, while her supervisor felt that “the entire 
office . . . was compromised,” Summerlin’s original attorney accompanied him to his next 
hearing. Id. 
 25 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1087–88.  
 26 Id. at 1087. While Ms. Roe was still representing him, Warren requested new 
counsel. Id. However, the trial judge denied Warren’s request for failure to establish 
grounds for new counsel. Id. Later, the trial judge submitted an affidavit stating that had he 
known of Ms. Roe’s tryst with the prosecutor, he would have granted Warren’s request. Id. 
 27 As it turned out, Ms. Roe did not represent Warren at trial. Id. at 1088. The court 
determined that due to Warren’s dissatisfaction with Ms. Roe’s representation, “it would be 
in the best interest of justice” to appoint new counsel. Id. Even so, Ms. Roe did not advise 
Warren of her relationship with the prosecutor. Id. 
 28 Id. The record indicates that there was ample evidence to mitigate Warren’s death 
sentence. Id. at 1084. Warren’s father was killed in a shootout. Id. Warren’s mother was an 
alcoholic who “beat him frequently[,] punished him by locking him in a room with 
ammonia fumes[,]” and forced him to receive electroshock therapy. Id. And, as has been 
mentioned, Warren suffered from mental disabilities. Id. 
 29 Id. at 1088–89. The United States Constitution requires death penalty cases to be 
tried in two phases: a trial phase where the defendant’s guilt is adjudicated, and, if guilt is 
found, a penalty or mitigation phase to determine if death is the appropriate sentence. See 
infra Part II.A–B. 
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he was sentenced.30 Further, Mr. Klink allowed Warren to bully him into 
making overtly poor trial decisions, such as not calling any expert witnesses 
during mitigation.31 
Fourth and finally, Judge Philip Marquardt, who presided over Warren’s 
trial, was addicted to marijuana and was actively consuming the drug 
throughout the proceedings.32 While the impact of Judge Marquardt’s drug use 
on Warren’s ultimate conviction and sentence is unclear, the record indicates 
that Judge Marquardt made unintelligible statements throughout the 
proceedings and mixed up facts from another case with the facts of Warren’s 
case.33 
As stated above, Warren’s death sentence was vacated.34 However, despite 
raising a cumulative error claim, Warren was never granted habeas relief.35 
The trouble is, if Warren—with all of the provocative issues that occurred 
during his trial—cannot get habeas relief on his cumulative error claim, it 
seems that no one can.36 History proves this point.37 So, why do cumulative 
error claims continue to be raised in capital federal habeas petitions?38 
This Note makes the case for removing cumulative error claims from the 
capital federal habeas context.39 Under the current restrictive approach to 
federal habeas corpus review, cumulative error claims are misplaced. They 
wrongly suggest that federal courts will conduct a comprehensive review of 
                                                                                                                     
 30 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1088. 
 31 Id. at 1089. 
 32 Id. at 1089–90.  
 33 Id. at 1090–91, 1090 n.2. See generally State v. Fisher, 686 P.2d 750 (Ariz. 1984). 
Ultimately, Judge Marquardt stepped down from the bench and was disbarred by the state 
of Arizona and the United States Supreme Court after an incident in which Judge 
Marquardt stated he could pin a drug transaction on his daughter’s boyfriend came to light. 
See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1089–90 n.1; see also In re Disbarment of Marquardt, 503 U.S. 
902 (1992) (mem.); In re Marquardt, 821 P.2d 161 (Ariz. 1991). 
 34 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084, 1121. 
 35 Id. at 1121. 
 36 To be sure, Warren’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit was filed after the effective date of 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Id. at 1092. Thus, the 
AEDPA governs Warren’s “right to appeal.” Id. However, Warren’s initial petition for 
habeas corpus was filed before the AEDPA’s effective date, so “pre-AEDPA law governs 
the petition itself.” Id. In this way, the federal court in Summerlin had more flexibility to 
grant the writ in that case than courts do in the post-AEDPA world. See generally infra 
Part II. Even so, the errors in Warren’s case apparently were not egregious enough to 
warrant granting the writ. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1121. 
 37 See infra Part II.C. 
 38 Obviously, hope is in large part responsible for the continued existence of the 
claim. When faced with the prospect of death at the hands of a broken, flawed system, a 
person will grasp at anything even suggesting the remote possibility of salvation. See 
VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN’S SEARCH FOR MEANING 28 (Wash. Square Press 1985) (1959). 
 39 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 
U.S.C.), should have killed off cumulative error claims in this context decades ago. See 
infra Part II.A–C. 
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each possible instance of unfairness that may have occurred and caused a 
factually innocent or otherwise undeserving person to be sentenced to death.40 
This is false.41 Federal courts conduct only the most perfunctory kinds of 
review when dealing with cumulative error claims rendering these claims’ 
(putatively) intended purpose—error-detection—unaccomplished.42 
The proper forum for comprehensive error review and analysis is state 
courts, specifically as a mandatory pre-federal habeas procedure.43 This Note 
suggests that the United States Supreme Court should remove cumulative error 
claims from capital federal habeas proceedings and enlist the state judiciaries 
to construct comprehensive error-review protocols in the same way it required 
the states to develop their own tests for intellectual disability.44 
Part II outlines the development of modern capital federal habeas 
jurisprudence and cumulative error claims. Part III surveys the various 
approaches to cumulative error claims in federal courts conducting habeas 
review throughout the country. Part IV describes the important role cumulative 
error claims play in ensuring reliability in capital cases and argues that federal 
habeas corpus is currently the wrong mechanism for state death row inmates 
seeking such review. Part V briefly concludes. 
II. THE AEDPA, MODERN CAPITAL FEDERAL HABEAS PETITIONS, AND 
CUMULATIVE ERROR CLAIMS 
On April 19, 1995, domestic terrorists, Timothy McVeigh and Terry 
Nichols, bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
killing 168 people and injuring around 680 others.45 In response to this 
                                                                                                                     
 40 The United States Supreme Court’s recent habeas corpus jurisprudence has 
emphatically demonstrated that federal courts reviewing state sentences should not be 
engaging in error detection and correction, but ensuring that the state court’s criminal 
procedures are not “unreasonable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012); Harrington v. 
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is 
different from an incorrect application of federal law.” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362, 410 (2000))).  
 41 See supra note 40.  
 42 See infra Part III. 
 43 See infra Part IV.B. 
 44 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that states cannot 
sentence “mentally retarded” individuals to death). Notably, federal courts have continued 
to play a supervisory role over state procedures for adjudicating claims of intellectual 
disability. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (holding that Florida’s 
procedures for adjudicating intellectual disability claims were too “rigid” and created an 
unconstitutional risk of executing intellectually disabled persons in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 45 OKLA. DEP’T OF CIVIL EMERGENCY MGMT., AFTER ACTION REPORT: ALFRED P. 
MURRAH FEDERAL BUILDING BOMBING 4, 16 (1995), https://www.ok.gov/OEM/documents/ 
Bombing%20After%20Action%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/9MD4-6XWQ]; Elizabeth 
Chuck, Twenty Years Later: The People in the Oklahoma City Bombing, NBC NEWS (Apr. 
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national tragedy, the United States Congress passed the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death penalty Act (AEDPA),46 which President Clinton signed into 
law on April 24, 1996.47 
Curiously, the AEDPA, which drastically curtailed federal habeas relief, 
did not originate in the wake of the bombing, but was a part of a package of 
legislation the so-called “Gingrich Congress” campaigned on in 1994.48 As a 
bill, the AEDPA was first introduced in January 1995 and was designed to cut 
back federal habeas relief for both non-capital and capital prisoners.49 The 
bombing in Oklahoma City proved to be the necessary catalyst to get Congress 
to vote on and approve the bill, which originally had nothing to do with 
terrorism or the death penalty per se.50 
In the almost two decades since the AEDPA’s passage, federal habeas 
corpus has been reduced from the “great writ,”51 as it was once called, to a 
labyrinthine process where the chance of finding relief is “microscopic.”52 
Before engaging in a focused discussion of cumulative error claims in federal 
habeas petitions,53 a general overview of the substantive and procedural 
impacts of the AEDPA is necessary. 
A. The Rigid Rules of Federal Capital Habeas Corpus: The AEDPA 
and Related Jurisprudence 
Historically, state inmates could petition a federal court for a writ of 
habeas corpus whenever they felt the federal protections in place for criminal 
defendants were being violated by their incarceration.54 Inmates could 
challenge the legality of their incarceration without any time limits on these 
                                                                                                                     
18, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/twenty-years-later-people-oklahoma-
city-bombing-n342821 [http://perma.cc/6HJ6-YRFH]. 
 46 See 141 CONG. REC. 15,095 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“The most critical 
element of this bill, and the one that bears most directly on the tragic events in Oklahoma 
City, is the provision reforming the so-called habeas corpus rules.”). 
 47 William J. Clinton, President, Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Apr. 24, 1996), in 32 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL 
DOCUMENTS 719, 719 (1996) (“After the tragedy in Oklahoma City, I asked Federal law 
enforcement agencies to reassess their needs and determine which tools would help them 
meet the new challenge of domestic terrorism. . . . I am pleased that the Congress included 
most of the [agencies’] proposals in this legislation.”). 
 48 See James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”? AEDPA and Error 
Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 412 (2001). 
 49 Id.  
 50 See Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in 
Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 728–29 (2002). 
 51 See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 749 (quoting W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980)). 
 52 NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 81–84 (2011). 
 53 See infra Parts II.C, III. 
 54 See Liebman, supra note 48, at 415. 
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challenges.55 Moreover, res judicata did not estop inmates from petitioning a 
federal court multiple times.56 Further, a state court’s adjudication on the 
legality of a state inmate’s incarceration—during state collateral or post-
conviction proceedings—had no effect on a federal court’s adjudication of the 
same issue.57 However, the passage of the AEDPA fundamentally changed the 
relationship between federal and state courts in the context of collateral 
reviews of criminal convictions and sentences severely limiting the chances 
relief will be granted to criminal defendants.58 
The AEDPA requires federal courts to defer to state court rulings on 
substantially all issues raised in federal habeas.59 So long as a state court’s 
ruling was not “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” “clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States,” federal courts generally must not disturb the state’s ruling on the 
                                                                                                                     
 55 Id. For a discussion of the impacts of the AEDPA on the timing of federal habeas 
petitions, see Anne R. Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and 
Federal Habeas Corpus, 68 MD. L. REV. 545, 552–54 (2009). 
 56 Liebman, supra note 48, at 415. One of the greatest impacts of the AEDPA in the 
context of capital federal habeas petitioners is the reduction of the availability of so-called 
“second or successive” habeas petitions. While the AEDPA placed special emphasis on 
finality of state criminal proceedings and cut back the opportunity for federal habeas 
petitioners to seek multiple reviews of their claims in federal court, it did so at a cost to 
petitioners who have claims that are not yet ripe during their initial habeas proceeding. For 
example, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of persons deemed incompetent to 
be executed. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). However, a person can only 
petition for habeas relief on a Ford claim when her execution is “imminent,” and so her 
claim is typically not ripe during her initial federal habeas petition. Stewart v. Martinez-
Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644 (1998). Thus, the Court had to interpret “second or 
successive” in the AEDPA as allowing for some claims to be raised in federal court after 
filing an initial federal habeas petition. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 947 
(2007) (holding that the AEDPA restrictions on “second or successive petitions” must not 
be construed literally such that some claims must be raised in the first instance although 
they are not yet ripe). For a full discussion of AEDPA’s effect on “late-ripening” habeas 
claims, see generally Kyle P. Reynolds, Comment, “Second or Successive” Habeas 
Petitions and Late-Ripening Claims after Panetti v. Quarterman, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1475 
(2007). 
 57 Liebman, supra note 48, at 415. 
 58 Andrew L. Adler, The Non-Waivability of AEDPA Deference’s Applicability, 67 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 767, 770–72 (2013). 
 59 Id. at 771. There are some caveats. For example, the AEDPA requires deference on 
any issue that the state court has adjudicated “on the merits.” The meaning of this phrase—
“on the merits”—is unclear and gives rise to a variety of litigation during federal habeas 
proceedings centered on when an issue was in fact adjudicated sufficiently to be deemed 
“on the merits.” See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 259, 293 (2006); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the 
Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 114 n.100 (2012); see, e.g., Washington v. Schriver, 
255 F.3d 45, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (noting the uncertain 
requirements the AEDPA imposes upon state courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 
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matter.60 This fundamental shift in federal habeas corpus jurisprudence strips 
the federal courts of the ability to unilaterally correct errors that may occur in a 
state court proceeding leaving innocent or wrongfully convicted or sentenced 
people in custody with no remedy.61 
Imposing deference upon the federal courts could be seen as a mechanism 
for addressing the tension that existed between federal and state courts as a 
result of the destabilizing effects of de novo habeas review.62 Further, 
deference to state court decisions promoted finality of criminal convictions 
and sentences, a key issue for the AEDPA’s promoters—especially in the 
capital context.63 For example, Republican Congressman William McCullom 
of Florida lambasted pre-AEDPA federal habeas corpus as an avenue for 
delaying justice for heinous killers: 
[C]onvicted murderers on death row regularly make a mockery of the 
criminal justice system by using every trick in the book to delay imposition of 
their sentences. In many cases where the people’s elected representatives 
have passed capital punishment laws, executions never occur because of 
endless appeals and lawsuits. People are sick and tired of the legal maneuvers 
of violent criminals. They want accountability. 
 
H.R. 729 [the Effective Death Penalty Act of 1995] stands for the clear 
and simple proposition that there must be finality and accountability.64 
The AEDPA’s strict deference requirements cut deeply against any 
possibility of legal gamesmanship during federal habeas corpus proceedings, 
which addressed issues of undue delay and trickery through litigation.65 
However, the AEDPA did not only amend the relationship between federal 
and state courts; the AEDPA rewrote the procedures a state inmate must 
adhere to in order to even have a federal court hear a petition for habeas 
corpus.66 
                                                                                                                     
 60 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012); see, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 
787 (2011) (“[S]tate proceedings are the central process, not just a preliminary step for a 
later federal habeas proceeding.”). 
 61 See Marceau, supra note 59, at 108–16; Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 
79 TEX. L. REV. 1731, 1754 (2000). 
 62 See DOYLE, supra note 5, at 1. 
 63 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 4,111 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); id. at 15,062 
(statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 64 Id. at 4,086 (statement of Rep. McCollum). 
 65 See Stevenson, supra note 50, at 729. 
 66 See DOYLE, supra note 5, at 17–18. For a step-by-step discussion of the elements 
necessary to comport with the AEDPA’s procedural guidelines, see COLUMBIA HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL 221–23 (9th ed. 2011) [hereinafter 
JAILHOUSE LAWYER], http://www3.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/ejlm.php [http://perma.cc/DK58-
U7CC]. 
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First and foremost, the AEDPA created a one-year statute of limitations 
for filing federal habeas corpus petitions.67 Prior to the AEDPA’s enactment, 
federal habeas corpus petitions could be filed at any time so long as the 
petitioner was in government custody.68 More than simply imposing a time 
constraint on federal habeas corpus petitions, the AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations applies differently depending upon the status of the petitioner.69 
On its face, the AEDPA requires all federal habeas corpus petitions to be 
filed within one year of a state conviction becoming finalized.70 However, 
several important exceptions exist.71 The one-year window to file a petition for 
habeas corpus in federal court starts running upon the completion of direct 
state review procedures, but the period is tolled during state collateral 
review.72 Further, the beginning of the one year filing window may also be 
delayed under other circumstances.73 Nonetheless, the AEDPA’s harsh statute 
of limitations requirement often precludes an inmate from even seeking habeas 
relief regardless of the merits of her underlying claims because she (or her 
counsel) is not aware of the precise filing deadline.74 In the world of the 
AEDPA, a missed deadline is generally fatal to an inmate’s opportunity for 
federal review.75 
In addition to its exacting and complex statute of limitations, the AEDPA 
also requires all federal claims to be exhausted in state court before they can 
                                                                                                                     
 67 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1), 2255(f) (2012). 
 68 United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 (1947) (“[H]abeas corpus provides a 
remedy . . . without limit of time.”). 
 69 See DOYLE, supra note 5, at 15–16. 
 70 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d), 2255(f). 
 71 See DOYLE, supra note 5, at 15–16. 
 72 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). However, the underlying state appeal must itself be timely 
according to state law. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006). In fact, the state 
appeal must be “properly filed” such that its delivery to the court or office in which it must 
be lodged is successful in order to toll the statute of limitations (although the substance of 
the appeal may be barred by other procedures). Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). 
 73 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). These scenarios include: the date of removal 
of a government impediment preventing the prisoner from filing for habeas relief, the date 
of Supreme Court recognition of the underlying federal right and of the right’s retroactive 
application, or the date of uncovering previously undiscoverable evidence upon which the 
habeas claim is predicated. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D). However, when the Supreme Court 
recognizes the right in one case, but recognizes the right’s retroactivity in another, later 
case, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the decision recognizing the 
right. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357–58 (2005). 
 74 See Liebman, supra note 48, at 417. For a full discussion of the impact of the 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations, see Ken Armstrong, Death By Deadline, Part One, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 15, 2014), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/11/15/ 
death-by-deadline-part-one [https://perma.cc/5U78-DMC4]. 
 75 There has been some pushback against the hard and fast statute of limitations the 
AEDPA prescribes. Scholars have argued and the United States Supreme Court has 
suggested that the AEDPA allows for “equitable tolling” in order to deal with the seeming 
impropriety with shuttering the federal courts from potentially meritorious claims. See 
Traum, supra note 55, at 547. 
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be reviewed in federal habeas proceedings.76 The AEDPA does create an 
exception to its state exhaustion requirement but, in order to qualify for the 
exception, a petitioner must demonstrate “an absence of available State 
corrective process [or] circumstances . . . that render such process ineffective 
to protect the rights of the [petitioner].”77 Nonetheless, the AEDPA’s strict 
exhaustion requirement can cause a petition that contains both exhausted and 
non-exhausted claims—a “mixed” petition—to be dismissed on the merits.78 
More troubling still, the AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement in addition to its 
statute of limitations creates the untenable situation where many inmates who 
wish to file federal habeas corpus petitions are unable to do so because, 
without the assistance of legal counsel, they fail to properly file state collateral 
appeals to exhaust their claims.79 
Dismissals of mixed petitions are particularly troubling under the AEDPA 
because the law generally prohibits second or successive petitions.80 Before 
the AEDPA, a petitioner could bring a second or successive habeas petition if 
she could establish “cause and prejudice” or a miscarriage of justice such that 
the second petition ought to be reviewed.81 However, the AEDPA instructs 
federal courts to dismiss a claim presented in a second or successive habeas 
petition that was previously presented.82 The AEDPA does allow some wiggle 
room for new claims in second or successive petitions, but not much.83 
To make matters worse for federal habeas petitioners, recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence has deliberately strengthened the AEDPA’s already biting 
restrictions such that a federal court can rarely grant evidentiary hearings let 
                                                                                                                     
 76 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2012).  
 77 Id. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). 
 78 Id. § 2254(b)(2). 
 79 See Liebman, supra note 48, at 417–18. Remarkably, even though exhausting state 
claims in state court is a prerequisite for federal habeas review, indigent inmates are not 
constitutionally required to have effective counsel during these state collateral reviews, 
which can cause these inmates to procedurally default on potentially meritorious claims 
due to the negligence or incompetence of their post-conviction counsel. See Maples v. 
Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012) (“[W]hen a petitioner’s postconviction attorney misses 
a filing deadline, the petitioner is bound by the oversight . . . .”); Coleman v. Thompson, 
501 U.S. 722, 755–56 (1991). 
 80 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001); see supra note 79. 
 81 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492–97 (1991). For a thorough discussion of 
pre-AEDPA second or successive habeas petition jurisprudence, see DOYLE, supra note 5, 
at 14–15. 
 82 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). 
 83 Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B). The AEDPA allows a petitioner to raise a new claim in a 
second or successive petition so long as it relies on a newly announced constitutional 
interpretation that is made retroactively applicable, or it is predicated upon newly 
discovered evidence not previously available through due diligence. Additionally, the 
Court held that Ford incompetency claims may be brought when they are ripe and do not 
have to be brought during an initial federal habeas petition. See supra note 56. 
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alone outright relief barring extreme circumstances.84 Consequently, a 
petitioner’s chances of getting habeas relief in federal court have dropped 
measurably post-AEDPA.85 
B. Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Mechanics: Discrete Constitutional 
Claims 
For state inmates sentenced to death, federal habeas corpus is the last 
opportunity for judicial review of their convictions and sentences.86 Aside 
from the AEDPA’s procedural requirements, federal habeas jurisprudence 
requires inmates to raise discrete constitutional claims in the substance of their 
petitions.87 
When an inmate petitions a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus, that 
inmate must claim that her incarceration violates the United States 
Constitution or one of the laws of the United States.88 However, because 
federal statutes do not govern state criminal procedures, a state inmate must 
show that her incarceration violates the United States Constitution.89 This last 
wrinkle is especially important when examining the situation of death row 
inmates, because substantially all death row inmates are state prisoners.90 
While federal habeas law permits a state death row inmate to raise a claim 
that any of her constitutional rights were violated, in practice, the claims raised 
                                                                                                                     
 84 See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1400 (2011) (holding that new facts 
developed during federal habeas proceedings have no bearing on federal habeas review 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (holding 
that only “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems” require federal 
intervention (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment))). 
 85 See Marceau, supra note 59, at 100–05. Professor Marceau evaluated a variety of 
studies examining the rates of success for both non-capital and capital federal habeas 
petitioners. His review does not place a precise figure on the decrease rate of success; 
however, his work suggests that the empirical evidence available demonstrates the trend is 
pointing towards reduced grants of habeas relief. Id. at 103–04. The difficulty with 
determining a clear “rate of success” is due in part to what “success” means. See id. at 99–
100 n.46 (noting that a win—or a grant of habeas relief—for one petitioner may be a loss 
for petitioners generally). 
 86 See Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 443, 457–58 (2007). The AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement in conjunction with its 
strict restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions establish federal habeas as the 
last, albeit most unhelpful, opportunity for a death row inmate to receive relief from the 
judiciary. See also DOYLE, supra note 5, at 13–15. 
 87 JAILHOUSE LAWYER, supra note 66, at 224–37. 
 88 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  
 89 See JAILHOUSE LAWYER, supra note 66, at 225 n.19.  
 90 See Criminal Justice Project of the NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 
Summary of State Lists of Prisoners on Death Row, DEATH ROW U.S.A., Fall 2014, at 34–
35. (stating that there are 63 federal death row inmates out of a total of 3,041 total death 
row inmates in the United States). 
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by death row inmates fall into two general categories.91 The first general 
category pertains to claims of counsel error;92 the second pertains to claims of 
constitutional error during the penalty phase of the trial.93 While counsel errors 
are governed by general constitutional jurisprudence, penalty phase errors 
during capital trials have received special treatment by the Supreme Court and 
are governed by their own distinct case law.94 
The most common constitutional claims raised by state death row inmates 
are claims of counsel error, implicating either the inmate’s right to due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment95 or her right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment.96 Counsel errors come in a variety of forms.97 However, 
generally, they concern either the death row inmate’s own counsel failing to 
take certain actions or insufficiently addressing certain claims,98 or the 
prosecution withholding evidence that would exculpate the inmate.99 Federal 
jurisprudence has created a two-pronged structure for these claims where an 
inmate must show not only the existence of a deficiency or error by counsel, 
but also that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceeding.100 The problem with this tiered approach to 
                                                                                                                     
 91 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (judgment of the court, and 
opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (holding that capital trials should occur in two 
steps assessing a defendant’s guilt before determining whether the death penalty is the 
appropriate sentence). 
 92 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984). 
 93 See infra note 94.  
 94 See Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782, 786 (2001); Penry v. Lynaugh 
(Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality 
opinion). These cases create specific penalty-phase constitutional claims. Because of the 
uniqueness of the death penalty, the Supreme Court has been careful to construct specific 
safeguards for the penalty phase whereas it has allowed general criminal procedure 
jurisprudence to guide the culpability phase. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (recognizing 
that “penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment” and emphasizing its 
“uniqueness”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286, 289 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (stating that “[d]eath is a unique punishment”, and “[d]eath . . . is in a class by 
itself”); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[P]enalty of death differs from all other forms 
of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.”). 
 95 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that the suppression of 
exculpatory evidence by the prosecution violates a state criminal defendant’s right to due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 96 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686–87 (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee 
of counsel in criminal proceedings requires effective counsel). 
 97 See John H. Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters: Reassociating Bagley 
Materiality, Strickland Prejudice, and Cumulative Harmless Error, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1153, 1157–58 n.9 (2005). 
 98 See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 514–16, 519–23 (2003).  
 99 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421–25 (1995). 
 100 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1166–68; see also United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 681–82 (1985) (requiring that undisclosed evidence be “material” where 
material is defined in terms of Strickland prejudice in order to raise a Brady claim); 
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counsel error claims is that it creates a legal fiction that deliberately requires 
courts to ignore errors so long as those errors are not sufficiently material.101 
That is, a legitimate counsel deficiency may have occurred, but, if the error did 
not have a significant enough impact on the outcome of the proceedings, the 
court will dismiss the claim as if no error had occurred at all.102 
Arguably, the most important constitutional claims for the purposes of 
state death row inmates filing federal habeas petitions are penalty phase 
constitutional claims because these claims attack the legitimacy of the 
proceedings that condemned the inmate to die, not the general proceedings that 
found the inmate guilty of a crime.103 The jurisprudential history of the penalty 
phase of capital trials suggests extreme caution should be exercised in 
imposing the death penalty.104 As a result, state death row inmates routinely 
raise two claims in their federal habeas corpus petitions that suggest relief 
should be granted because of errors in the penalty phase of their trials: 
Lockett105 error claims and Penry106 error claims. 
                                                                                                                     
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (establishing that a defendant must show both deficient 
performance and prejudice).  
 101 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1183–84. 
 102 Id. (“[C]ourts rely dogmatically on the tiered structure of Brady and Strickland 
errors (no constitutional error arises unless both performance defect and prejudice are 
shown) to dispose of claims, calculating that nothing (1/2 of Strickland) + nothing (3/4 of 
Brady) = nothing.”). 
 103 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) (noting that the 
death penalty is “profoundly different from all other penalties”). This category of claims 
also encompasses virtually all of the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence concerning the 
death penalty. The special significance surrounding death penalty cases and death row 
inmates is, of course, the sentences involved in these cases. Thus, both the general question 
of whether death is ever an appropriate sentence and the specific questions concerning 
specific methods of execution fall into this category. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 
41–44, 47–50 (2008) (discussing the historical development of different methods of 
execution and the Court’s repeated decisions to uphold those methods because “capital 
punishment is constitutional . . . [and so i]t necessarily follows that there must be a means 
of carrying it out”). The contemporary problem of reconciling the death penalty with the 
Eighth Amendment is captured succinctly by the dichotomy between so-called “absolute 
proportionality” and “comparative proportionality.” That is, courts must determine whether 
to examine the seriousness of the crime compared with the severity of the punishment or 
punishment practices in one jurisdiction in light of the punishment practices in another 
jurisdiction. See Susan Raeker-Jordan, Kennedy, Kennedy, and the Eighth Amendment: 
“Still in Search of a Unifying Principle”?, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 107, 111 (2011). 
 104 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (requiring a jury to find the 
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors in order to qualify a defendant for the 
death penalty); id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that a jury, not a 
judge, should make the ultimate decision to sentence a defendant to death); Skipper v. 
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (holding that the capital sentencer must not be 
precluded from considering any mitigating evidence that may suggest a penalty less than 
death is sufficient). 
 105 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (holding that a capital defendant must be able to present 
any mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial). 
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Lockett and Penry establish a capital defendant’s right, under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, to present any and all evidence that could 
persuade a jury that a sentence less than death is sufficient and that the jury 
should be able to consider and give effect to that evidence.107 Under Lockett, a 
capital defendant must be able to present any relevant mitigating evidence 
during the penalty phase.108 If a court precludes any such evidence, then a 
Lockett error has occurred.109 Under the Penry series of cases, the jury 
instructions at the end of the penalty phase must allow the jury to express a 
“‘reasoned moral response’ to [mitigation] evidence in rendering its 
sentencing decision.”110 Basically, the court cannot limit the jury’s 
consideration of the mitigation evidence presented to it.111 
While these distinct claims provide a variety of avenues for a death row 
inmate to seek relief in federal court, they do not ensure the reliability or 
justifiability of these inmates’ convictions or sentences.112 In raising either a 
counsel error claim or a penalty phase error claim, current habeas law 
deliberately prevents relief for errors so long as those errors are not substantial 
enough113 or the lower court did not unreasonably or incorrectly rule on 
them.114 As a result, these discrete claims do not on their own make the states’ 
imposition of the death penalty upon those convicted and sentenced to death 
any more reliable or any less risky.115 Enter cumulative error claims. 
C. Cumulative Error Claims 
In the federal habeas context, a cumulative error claim asks a federal court 
to grant relief because “two or more individually harmless errors” in the state 
                                                                                                                     
 106 Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782, 804 (2001); Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 
492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989). Taken together these two cases stand for the rule that the jury 
instructions at the end of the penalty phase must allow the jury to give meaningful effect to 
the mitigation evidence presented. See Ryan C. Thomas, Comment, Not-So-Harmless 
Error: A Higher Standard for Mitigation Errors on Capital Habeas Review, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 515, 532 (2014). 
 107 See Thomas, supra note 106, at 522. 
 108 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; see Thomas, supra note 106, at 527 (“Lockett is to 
mitigation as Miranda is to post-arrest silence.” (footnote omitted)). 
 109 See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 120 n.1 (1982). 
 110 Penry I, 492 U.S. at 328. For a full discussion of the effects of expansive mitigation 
evidence on juries, see generally Michael E. Antonio, Stress and the Capital Jury: How 
Male and Female Jurors React to Serving on a Murder Trial, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 396 (2008). 
 111 See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 263–64 (2007) (holding that a 
jury must be allowed to consider a defendant’s culpability in light of his personal history 
before undertaking the “grave task of imposing a death sentence”). 
 112 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1183–84. See generally Moyer, supra note 
10, at 454–63. 
 113 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1166–68. 
 114 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2) (2012); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 
(2000); Liebman, supra note 48, at 418–21. 
 115 See Liebman, supra note 48, at 423–27. 
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proceeding cumulatively deprived the petitioner of her right to a fair trial.116 
Conceptually, cumulative error claims serve as a check on the reliability of 
state convictions and sentences because they allow an inmate to receive 
judicial review of claims that by themselves could be summarily dismissed.117 
In this way, cumulative error claims seem to serve as residual, catchall claims 
that allow federal courts to double check their work and reaffirm that when 
they dismiss a habeas petition they have not missed any glaring errors in the 
state proceeding.118 However, cumulative error claims rarely, if ever, lead to 
habeas relief.119 Moreover, since the AEDPA requires an unreasonable or 
contrary application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the 
United States Supreme Court under section 2254(d),120 it seems as though 
habeas relief cannot be granted on a cumulative error claim at all because the 
Supreme Court has not explicitly said so.121 
Nonetheless, cumulative error claims are routinely raised in federal habeas 
corpus petitions by state death row inmates because of the possibility that 
given the right set of facts and circumstances, relief could be had.122 The allure 
of cumulative error claims is driven by the underdeveloped Supreme Court 
jurisprudence undergirding the claim and the claim’s ambiguous origin—two 
characteristics that foster creative lawyering and breed (false) hope for 
petitioners. 
Depending on whom you ask,123 cumulative error claims originated with 
Taylor v. Kentucky or Chambers v. Mississippi.124 Either way, the doctrine—
                                                                                                                     
 116 See Moyer, supra note 10, at 463 (quoting Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1122 
(10th Cir. 2008)); see, e.g., Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 
982, 992 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
 117 See Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Individual errors that do not 
entitle a petitioner to relief may do so when combined . . . .”). 
 118 See Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp. 2d 260, 374 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (“[T]he reliability of 
a state criminal trial can be substantially undermined by a series of events, none of which 
individually amounts to a constitutional violation . . . .”).  
 119 See, e.g., Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
 120 See supra Part II.A. 
 121 See Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 447 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 122 See, e.g., Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 679 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 123 Compare Moyer, supra note 10, at 464, with Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 
1185. 
 124 See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487 n.15 (1978) (stating that “the 
cumulative effect of the potentially damaging circumstances of this case violated the due 
process guarantee of fundamental fairness”); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 
(1973) (“We need not decide, however, whether this error alone would occasion reversal 
since Chambers’ claimed denial of due process rests on the ultimate impact of that error 
when view in conjunction with the trial court’s refusal to permit him to call other 
witnesses.” (emphasis added)). While the Court in Chambers does not explicitly use the 
word “cumulative,” it does describe how the net effect of multiple errors can deprive a 
criminal defendant of due process. See id. Moreover, while Taylor was decided five years 
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however confused and underdeveloped in application—is clear enough to 
understand conceptually: multiple errors occurring within the same state 
proceeding may not individually deprive a defendant of her constitutional right 
to due process, but may do so cumulatively.125 
Despite the doctrinal difficulties with the claim, cumulative error claims 
persist to protect the fundamental fairness of state criminal proceedings 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.126 In the capital context, fairness 
and reliability take on a heightened significance because of the gravitas of 
what is at stake.127 Perhaps, that heightened concern contributes to the claim’s 
continued existence. 
III. CUMULATIVE ERROR CLAIMS ACROSS THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS: AN 
UPHILL BATTLE FOR APPELLANTS128 
The fuzzy origin of cumulative error claims along with the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to elaborate on them has led to wide disparities among the 
federal circuits as to how to handle these claims in habeas proceedings.129 
While all federal circuits address cumulative error claims on direct appeal, the 
circuits are split as to whether or not they should review cumulative error 
claims in habeas petitions.130 Further, even among circuits that agree on 
whether they should review cumulative error claims in habeas petitions, they 
                                                                                                                     
after Chambers, the Court expressly describes the aggregate impact of multiple harmless 
errors as “cumulative” in that case. Taylor, 436 U.S. at 487 n.15. 
 125 See Moyer, supra note 10, at 463. 
 126 See Taylor, 436 U.S. at 487 n.15. 
 127 John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Address to 
the American Bar Association (Aug. 6, 2005), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/ 
speeches/viewspeech/sp_08-06-05 [http://perma.cc/2T4E-VS9X] (“[W]ith the benefit of 
DNA evidence, we have learned that a substantial number of death sentences have been 
imposed erroneously. That evidence is profoundly significant - not only because of its 
relevance to the debate about the wisdom of continuing to administer capital punishment, 
but also because it indicates that there must be serious flaws in our administration of 
criminal justice.”). 
 128 See Knight v. Spencer, 447 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir. 2006) (“We add, without deciding, 
that even were the argument of cumulative effect properly before us, it would be an uphill 
battle for appellant.”). 
 129 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1185 n.117. 
 130 See id. The rationale for the distinction between reviewing these claims on direct 
review as opposed to reviewing them on collateral review during habeas proceedings has 
been unsatisfactory. See Rachel A. Van Cleave, When Is an Error Not an “Error”? 
Habeas Corpus and Cumulative Error Analysis, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 59, 63 (1994). Federal 
appellate courts readily accept these claims during direct review, but waffle at them during 
collateral review proceedings without much discussion as to the constitutional distinction. 
Finality, procedural default, and a lack of clearly established federal law may justify the 
exclusion of these claims from federal habeas review, but the United States Supreme Court 
has remained silent as the circuits have struggled to find a unified approach to handling 
them. 
982 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:4 
approach the claims with their own tests and analysis standards.131 To get a 
sense for the current state of the doctrine, consider the following brief survey 
of the different circuit standards. 
A. The Majority 
All but three federal circuits allow cumulative error claims in federal 
habeas corpus petitions without exception.132 However, each of these circuits 
has established its own standard to evaluate these claims.133 Consequently, 
despite their similarity in allowing cumulative error claims in federal habeas, 
these circuits vary greatly in how they handle these claims. 
These circuits share the same general purpose in allowing cumulative error 
claims in federal habeas: to ensure the fundamental fairness of the petitioner’s 
state trial proceedings.134 These circuits derive this rationale for allowing 
cumulative error claims in federal habeas corpus petitions from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process guarantee for state judicial proceedings.135 
The different tests used in each of these circuits demonstrates a high 
degree of irregularity in examining cumulative error claims in federal habeas. 
At the most fundamental level, each circuit court uses a test that requires two 
                                                                                                                     
 131 Van Cleave, supra note 130, at 61–62 (“While the vast majority of habeas petitions 
alleging cumulative error fail, only a few cases analyze in any detail precisely what 
‘cumulative error analysis’ entails, and even fewer define the types of ‘errors’ which courts 
should consider for purposes of cumulative error analysis.”). Van Cleave argues that the 
Court’s silence concerning the scope of cumulative error doctrine is more fundamental than 
the procedures used to analyze these claims. She articulates for three distinct cumulative 
error “situations”—aggregating multiple clear constitutional errors, aggregated multiple 
clear errors of state law, and aggregating multiple errors none of which amount to 
violations of either the Constitution or state law. Id. at 60–61. To be sure, errors of state 
law are not grounds for habeas relief. Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861 (2011) (per 
curiam) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)). Nonetheless, the Court’s 
nebulous description of cumulative error claims as remedies to flaws in “fundamental 
fairness” has not precisely described the true meaning of what errors should be used in 
determining whether cumulative error tips the scale towards granting habeas relief. See 
Moyer, supra note 10, at 463. 
 132 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1185 n.117. These circuits include the First, 
Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. Id. 
 133 See Ballard v. McNeil, 785 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1336 n.22 (N.D. Fla. 2011). In 
Ballard, the court examines in detail the general split among the circuits as to how to 
handle claims of cumulative error and outlines the fractures among the disparate camps on 
opposite sides of that split. Id. 
 134 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1184–86. 
 135 See, e.g., Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007). Notably, at least two 
of these circuits cite to Supreme Court cases as the “clearly established” precedent 
necessary to address these claims under the AEDPA. See id. (citing Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973)); Darks v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1001, 1018 (10th Cir. 
2003) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)). 
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elements: a “cumulative error” element and a “fairness” element.136 In the 
abstract, these elements require a petitioner to show that multiple errors 
rendered her state trial unfair. However, the many permutations of the 
“cumulative error” element undermine any uniformity across these circuits.137 
To satisfy the “cumulative error” element, the First Circuit requires 
petitioners to show that their trial was “so riddled with error that [the trial] 
lacked the appearance of fairness and impartiality necessary to satisfy due 
process.”138 This standard, like others below, is highly subjective. The First 
Circuit does not describe what “so riddled with error” means nor does it 
elaborate further on the element.139 
The Second Circuit requires petitioners to show that multiple errors “cast 
such doubt on the fairness of the proceedings that a new trial is warranted, 
even if no single error requires reversal.”140 Again, the Second Circuit does 
not expressly define or thoroughly describe what “such doubt” is or what that 
phrase means.141 
The Third Circuit’s requirements for cumulative error in federal habeas 
petitions are less colorful, but no less opaque. They require petitioners to 
show, plainly, that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprives the 
petitioner of due process.142 This standard does not require a subjective 
evaluation of the cumulative claim by the courts like the others; however, it is 
still unhelpful to petitioners who must attempt to show a due process violation 
without any specific guidance. 
Like the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit uses a plainly-worded albeit 
frustratingly unspecific standard for cumulative error claims. It maintains that 
a petitioner must show that the cumulative effect of multiple errors either 
                                                                                                                     
 136 See, e.g., United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1329 (11th Cir. 1983) (“We must 
consider the cumulative effect of [the alleged errors] and determine whether, viewing the 
trial as a whole, appellants received a fair trial as is their due under our Constitution.” 
(citing United States v. Labarbera, 581 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1978))). The two-part structure 
of cumulative error claims mirrors the two-part structure in Brady or Strickland claims in 
many ways. See supra Part II.B. 
 137 As will be shown, what constitutes an error that can be cumulated for purposes of 
determining fundamental fairness is greatly contested. This element has been in flux as a 
result of the Supreme Court’s silence on cumulative error claims. See Van Cleave, supra 
note 130, at 60–63. 
 138 Mello v. DiPaulo, 295 F.3d 137, 151 (1st Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 
 139 Subsequent cases in the First Circuit have simply referred to Mello when analyzing 
cumulative error claims without any development or further explanation. See, e.g., Crouse 
v. Dickhaut, C.A. No. 07-12004-MLW, 2013 WL 1054845, at *15 (D. Mass. Mar. 13, 
2013). 
 140 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 145 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 
 141 See id. 
 142 See Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 94 n.44 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Moreover unified 
consideration of the claims in the petition well satisfies the interests of justice because the 
cumulative effect of the alleged errors may violate due process, requiring the grant of the 
writ, whereas any one alleged error considered alone may be deemed harmless.” (quoting 
United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 631 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1980))). 
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“prejudiced” the petitioner,143 or deprived the petitioner of her due process 
right to a fair trial.144 It does not state whether the “prejudice” required is the 
same as the “prejudice” required for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
although it suggests something to this effect.145 The consequence of defining 
prejudice in this way is the restriction of the claim to only those petitioners 
making arguments about their counsel’s performance.146 
The Seventh Circuit incorporates the Tenth Circuit’s cumulative error test 
into its own standard.147 The Tenth Circuit’s approach to cumulative error 
claims in federal habeas stands alone from the previously described tests 
because it only allows “actual errors” to be cumulated as opposed to merely 
“adverse” events.148 While the Tenth Circuit includes both the familiar 
“cumulative error” and “fairness” elements in its test, its requirement that only 
“actual errors” be cumulated severely limits what petitioners can raise in their 
cumulative error claims.149 
In United States v. Rivera, the Tenth Circuit en banc held that adverse 
impacts on a trial outcome that cannot be connected to an underlying error or 
can only be connected to a “non-error” should not be cumulated in order to 
grant relief.150 The Rivera court reasoned that allowing an appellate court to 
cumulate all adverse effects even those not produced by “actual errors” would 
vest “nearly uncontrolled discretion in the appellate courts.”151 However, the 
Rivera court defined “actual error” as a “type[] of error that can lead to 
reversal of a defendant’s criminal conviction.”152 Consequently, the Tenth 
Circuit seems to suggest that a petitioner can only be successful on a 
cumulative error claim if she can show that her trial was affected by multiple 
errors that could independently provide her with relief.153 In other words, a 
successful cumulative error claim may be superfluous considering that in order 
for a cumulative error claim to be successful there may have to be at least two 
other claims that would also be successful. 
The Seventh Circuit’s incorporation of the Tenth Circuit’s cumulative 
error analysis suggests “actual errors” are not “reversible errors.” The Seventh 
                                                                                                                     
 143 Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1254 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 144 Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 145 See Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1992) (defining “prejudice” as 
“unfairness . . . from the totality of counsel’s errors and omissions” (quoting United States 
v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 595 (9th Cir. 1983))). 
 146 See id. at 619–22. 
 147 See Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2000). Consequently, examining 
the Tenth Circuit standard illuminates the rule across both circuits. 
 148 See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470–71 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
 149 See id. at 1469–71. 
 150 Id. at 1471. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 As one Ninth Circuit court put it: “Because no individual errors underlying [the 
petitioner’s] convictions [had] been demonstrated, no cumulative error exists.” United 
States v. Franklin, 321 F.3d 1231, 1241 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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Circuit maintains that an “actual error” is a “constitutional error” and, for 
cumulative error purposes, errors that are cumulated must be “individually 
harmless.”154 However, the distinction between a so-called “constitutional 
error” that is harmless and an “adverse” event that is not an error is unclear. As 
a result, in the Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, petitioners often raise their 
cumulative error claims without attempting to satisfy this distinction.155 Most 
of the time, a petitioner will raise any and all perceived errors that occurred 
during her state criminal proceedings in her cumulative error claim hoping the 
net effect will lead to relief.156 
The Eleventh Circuit flips the common approach on its head. Rather than 
first examining the “cumulative error” element and then moving onto an 
evaluation of the fundamental fairness of the state proceeding, the Eleventh 
Circuit uses the “fairness” element as a gate-keeping device.157 It requires 
petitioners to show that their trial was unfair before it will examine cumulative 
error claims.158 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit refers to the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuit’s jurisprudence on cumulative error to define the claim.159 This may 
mean the Eleventh Circuit is likely to reverse course and join the dissenting 
circuits that effectively do not allow cumulative error claims in federal 
habeas.160 
The Fifth Circuit has, arguably, the most extensive cumulative error 
jurisprudence in the federal habeas context.161 The launching point for the 
Fifth Circuit’s approach to cumulative error in federal habeas is Derden v. 
McNeel.162 
Derden involved a petitioner, Mr. George Guy Derden, who was convicted 
of burglary in Mississippi and sentenced to seven years in prison.163 After 
exhausting his state remedies, Derden petitioned for federal habeas relief on 
the grounds that the prosecutor acted improperly during trial, improperly 
                                                                                                                     
 154 See Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 155 See, e.g., Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205, 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
none of the petitioner’s alleged errors rendered his trial unfair either independently or 
cumulatively). 
 156 See, e.g., id. 
 157 See, e.g., Allen v. Sec’y., Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 611 F.3d 740, 765 (11th Cir. 2010), 
aff’g Allen v. McNeil, No. 03-10077-CIV, 2009 WL 856017 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2009). 
 158 See Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1386–87 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 159 See id. 
 160 See infra Part III.B. 
 161 See Van Cleave, supra note 130, at 72–80; see also Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, 
at 1185 n.117. 
 162 Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1454 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
 163 Derden v. McNeel, 938 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1991), on reh’g 978 F.2d 1453 
(1992). While Derden did not involve a capital sentence, it is the touchstone of cumulative 
error jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Bernard, 762 F.3d 467, 
482 (5th Cir. 2014); Livingston v. Johnson, 107 F.3d 297, 309 (5th Cir. 1997). 
Consequently, it is relevant to the analysis of cumulative error claims in federal habeas 
petitions inclusive of both capital and non-capital cases. 
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questioned jurors during voir dire, and the trial judge’s inappropriate 
demeanor had unfairly prejudiced him.164 
Initially, the Fifth Circuit panel accepted that cumulative error was a basis 
for habeas corpus relief because the cumulative effects of multiple errors may 
have deprived Derden of a fair trial.165 The panel stated that, in reviewing 
cumulative error claims, “[t]here is no set formula and each case must be 
independently examined.”166 The panel described the review process for 
cumulative error claims as a determination of “whether the trial taken as a 
whole is fundamentally unfair.”167 This idyllic approach to cumulative error 
did not last long as the Fifth Circuit voted to consider Derden’s case en banc 
and subsequently reversed.168 
The en banc Fifth Circuit described entertaining cumulative error claims in 
federal habeas corpus petitions as “a difficult theoretical proposition.”169 
Facially, the en banc court recognized that the cumulative effect of multiple 
errors may deprive a petitioner of her due process right to a fair trial.170 
However, the standard it articulated for determining if cumulative errors 
required habeas relief effectively precludes a meaningful handling of the 
claim. 
Much like the Tenth Circuit’s distinction between “actual errors” and 
“adverse” events, the Fifth Circuit constructed a four-prong test in Derden that 
restricts what claims a federal court can cumulate in federal habeas 
proceedings.171 First, errors alleged in a cumulative error claim must refer only 
to errors committed in the state trial court that have not been cured by that 
court.172 Second, the errors must not be procedurally barred.173 Third, the 
errors must be “constitutional”—that is they must have “so infused the trial 
with unfairness as to deny due process of law.”174 Fourth, the errors must 
make it more likely than not that the verdict is “suspect.”175 
While this test appears to allow petitioners to raise cumulative error claims 
in their federal habeas corpus petitions, it effectively has eliminated 
consideration of the claims unless the underlying errors could independently 
give rise to relief. This is primarily a function of the “constitutionality” 
element of the test. 
                                                                                                                     
 164 Derden, 938 F.2d at 610–18. 
 165 Id. at 618. 
 166 Id. at 609. 
 167 Id. (emphasis added). 
 168 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1456 (en banc). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 1456–59. 
 171 Id. at 1458. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1458 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 228 
(1941)). 
 175 Id. 
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The Fifth Circuit’s constitutionality element is similar to the Tenth 
Circuit’s actual error-adverse event test, but it is more restrictive. Where the 
Tenth Circuit at least suggests that actual errors do not have to require relief 
independently, the Fifth Circuit requires that constitutional errors necessitate 
relief on their own.176 Thus, if a petitioner cannot get relief on any one of her 
claims, she cannot get relief via cumulative error.177 
In practice, the differences among these circuits’ approaches to cumulative 
error claims in federal habeas petitions are largely irrelevant considering a 
petitioner’s rate of success is virtually zero, regardless of jurisdiction.178 In 
most cases, the federal court examining the claim will handle the claim 
succinctly in a pro forma manner.179 First, the court will note the petitioner has 
raised the claim.180 Then, the court will state the relevant circuit standard for 
the claim.181 Next, the court will conclude that the petitioner has not met that 
standard.182 In some cases, the court will further state that even if the 
petitioner had met the standard the court could not grant relief on the claim 
because the lower court183 did not act unreasonably in dismissing the claim.184 
This last point drives home the fact that the AEDPA has largely rendered 
cumulative error claims meaningless exercises only nominally concerned with 
fairness because there is no guiding Supreme Court precedent directly on 
point.185 
                                                                                                                     
 176 Id.; see also Van Cleave, supra note 130, at 81–82. 
 177 United States v. Bernard, 762 F.3d 467, 482 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 178 See Moyer, supra note 10, at 463 (“Importantly, however, the accumulation of non-
errors generally fails to rise to the level of a due process violation.”); Van Cleave, supra 
note 130, at 61 (“[T]he vast majority of habeas petitions alleging cumulative error 
fail . . . .”). Over the past six months, I have tracked every federal habeas case raising a 
cumulative error claim and none have led to relief being granted on that claim alone. 
 179 Van Cleave, supra note 130, at 61. 
 180 See Nickelberry v. Soto, No. 2:14-cv-01168-JKS, 2015 WL 502935, at *29 (E.D. 
Cal. Feb. 5, 2015). It is worth noting that the court in Nickelberry refers to Chambers and 
Brecht for support of its cumulative error doctrine despite the fact that those cases did not 
establish clear Supreme Court precedent in regards to cumulative error claims in the federal 
habeas context. See infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 181 See Nickelberry, 2015 WL 502935, at *29. 
 182 Id. 
 183 In some cases, the “lower court” will be the federal district court; in others, it will 
be the state court. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 184 See Mello v. DiPaulo, 295 F.3d 137, 151–52 (1st Cir. 2002).  
 185 A federal court may only grant habeas relief upon a claim adjudicated on the merits 
in state court if the state court’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable 
application of “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). In other words, without clear Supreme Court 
precedent, federal courts may not grant habeas relief. See infra Part IV.B.2. However, the 
Ninth and the Tenth Circuits maintain that there is clear Supreme Court precedent for 
addressing cumulative error claims in federal habeas. See supra note 135. Yet, both of 
these circuits’ references to clearly established federal law suffers from the same flaw: they 
constructively establish post facto the Supreme Court precedent required by the AEDPA. 
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For example, take Cunningham v. Merrill.186 In that case, the federal 
magistrate judge recommended dismissing the petitioner’s cumulative error 
claim because it was not raised in state court and so it was not properly 
exhausted.187 Further, the magistrate stated any claim the petitioner raised 
could only lead to relief if he could show that state court unreasonably or 
incorrectly applied federal law.188 Thus, even if the petitioner had exhausted 
her cumulative error claim, she could not receive habeas relief because she 
could not show that the lower court acted unreasonably or incorrectly.189 
This last conclusion drives home a common theme among the circuits that 
allow cumulative error claims in federal habeas: it is a useless, yet complex 
claim. Petitioners do not get relief from it. Courts do not do much with it 
(other than create nonspecific standards about fairness). The situation does not 
improve in the circuits that have functionally eschewed cumulative error from 
federal habeas petitions. 
B. The Dissent 
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits either explicitly or effectively do 
not allow cumulative error claims to be raised in federal habeas corpus 
petitions.190 While agreeing that cumulative error claims ought to be precluded 
                                                                                                                     
The Ninth Circuit cites to Chambers for the required precedent, but the Court in Chambers 
states directly “[i]n reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional 
law.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). To overcome this hurdle, the 
Ninth Circuit blends Chambers with Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974), 
which expressly does not adopt the due process violation the Ninth Circuit cites it for, in 
order to establish the necessary precedent. See Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th 
Cir. 2007). The Tenth Circuit maintains that “[c]umulative error analysis is an extension of 
harmless error” and cites to Brecht for Supreme Court support. Darks v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 
1001, 1018 (10th Cir. 2003). However, this “extension” misconstrues Brecht’s holding to 
serve the Tenth Circuit’s end goals. Brecht itself only outlines the distinction between the 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt error standard established in Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), and the substantial and injurious harmless error standard 
articulated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 752 (1946), and holds that the latter 
standard applies during collateral review. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 
(1993). For a full discussion of the Court’s evolving harmless error jurisprudence, see 
Thomas, supra note 106, at 532–38. 
 186 Cunningham v. Merrill, No. Civ. 02-158-B-S, 2003 WL 1712511, at *4 (D. Me. 
Apr. 1, 2003). 
 187 Id. at *7. 
 188 Id. at *2–3. Without the Supreme Court providing an express mandate governing 
cumulative error claims, it seems improbable that a petitioner can show that a lower court 
acted unreasonably or incorrectly in deciding these claims. 
 189 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 190 See Ballard v. McNeil, 785 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1336 n.22 (N.D. Fla. 2011) 
(describing how the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits do not allow cumulative error in 
federal habeas petitions). 
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from federal habeas petitions, each of these circuits discards the claim using its 
own logic and rationale. 
1. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits 
The simplest approach is captured by the Eighth Circuit’s treatment of 
cumulative error claims in federal habeas, which expressly prohibits these 
claims in this context.191 While this rule is straightforward enough, the Eighth 
Circuit provides scant reasoning as to why cumulative error claims are not 
appropriate for federal collateral review.192 The Circuit’s leading case on 
cumulative error claims in federal habeas, Wainwright v. Lockhart, states 
simply: “Errors that are not unconstitutional individually cannot be added 
together to create a constitutional violation.”193 
The Fourth Circuit incorporates the Eighth Circuit’s cumulative error 
jurisprudence through its leading case on those claims in the federal habeas 
context: Fisher v. Angelone.194 In Fisher, the Fourth Circuit held both claims 
of counsel error and claims of trial court error must be reviewed “individually, 
rather than collectively.”195 The Fisher court cited directly to the Eighth 
Circuit’s Wainwright decision to demonstrate its accord with sister circuits on 
the issue of cumulative error in habeas petitions.196 
                                                                                                                     
 191 Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that errors 
that are not unconstitutional individually cannot be added together to create a constitutional 
violation). 
 192 See Van Cleave, supra note 130, at 71–72. 
 193 Wainwright, 80 F.3d at 1233. 
 194 Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852–53 (4th Cir. 1998). There is some confusion 
over the Fourth Circuit’s stance on cumulative error in federal habeas corpus petitions. As 
noted previously, all federal appellate courts entertain cumulative error claims on direct 
appeal. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also Moyer, supra note 10, at 464. 
The Fourth Circuit is no exception. See United States v. Ollivierre, 378 F.3d 412, 422–23 
n.8 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1112 (2005). However, according 
to John H. Blume and his co-author Christopher Seeds, the Fourth Circuit “appl[ies] 
cumulative error analysis, without explicit distinction from the direct-appeal context, in the 
review of habeas corpus petitions.” Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1185 n.117. This 
conclusion is incorrect, yet the mistake is understandable. The Fourth Circuit has not 
maintained clear separation between its direct appeal cumulative error doctrine and its 
collateral review cumulative error doctrine. In United States v. Hicks, the Fourth Circuit 
applied Fisher—its habeas cumulative error touchstone—to dismiss a claim of cumulative 
error on direct appeal. 307 Fed. App’x 758, 763–64 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Fisher, 163 F.3d 
at 852 n.9). While in United States v. Lighty, the Fourth Circuit did not mention Fisher and 
stuck with a more traditional cumulative error standard in reviewing such a claim on direct 
appeal. 616 F.3d 321, 371 (4th Cir. 2010). These mixed messages both contribute to 
widespread misunderstandings of the Fourth Circuit’s stance on cumulative error and 
demonstrate the need for clarity from the Supreme Court. 
 195 Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852. 
 196 Id. at 852–53. To be sure, the Fisher court does not expressly draw the distinction 
between cumulative error claims in the habeas context and cumulative error claims on 
direct appeal. See id. Nonetheless, given the context in which Fisher itself was decided in 
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The Fourth Circuit’s adoption of the Eighth Circuit’s approach to 
cumulative error claims in the federal habeas context demonstrates the 
jurisprudential mess that these claims have made among the circuits.197 The 
lack of Supreme Court guidance as to how cumulative error claims should be 
dealt with in federal habeas proceedings has caused misunderstandings by 
scholars and courts.198 It has also led to numerous suggestions to “expand” 
cumulative error despite the incomprehensible and irreconcilable doctrine 
available.199 In the face of all this confusion and conceptual innovation, the 
Sixth Circuit has constructed a sobering and sound approach to cumulative 
error in federal habeas proceedings. 
2. The Sixth Circuit 
By all outward appearances, the Sixth Circuit is just like the Eighth Circuit 
and imposes a blanket ban on cumulative error claims in federal habeas corpus 
petitions.200 However, the clarity of this seemingly straightforward judicial 
prohibition is incongruent with the fact that virtually all habeas petitions in the 
Sixth Circuit include cumulative error claims.201 So, what gives? 
This dilemma stems from the Sixth Circuit’s gnawing ambivalence about 
the claim’s existence. On the one hand, the Sixth Circuit’s defining case law 
states flatly that the Supreme Court has never expressly allowed cumulative 
error claims in federal habeas corpus petitions and so these claims are not 
cognizable in habeas.202 On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit continues to 
                                                                                                                     
conjunction to its deliberate use of Wainwright, it seems that the decision can only apply in 
the habeas context. However, problems persist with this interpretation. Marceau, supra 
note 59, at 90. Moreover, it does not seem that the Fisher court understood the significance 
of the context of its decision as it cites haphazardly to both direct appeal decisions and 
habeas decisions. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852–53. Compare Arnold v. Evatt, 113 F.3d 1352, 
1356 (4th Cir. 1997) (habeas proceeding), with United States v. Stewart, 20 F.3d 911, 912 
(8th Cir. 1994) (direct appeal). Perhaps part of the problem is that Fisher was decided in 
December 1998 and the AEDPA was only two years old at that point. Scholars have noted 
that the AEDPA seemed less “bite” than “hype” in those early years. See Blume, supra 
note 59, at 261. 
 197 See supra notes 194, 196 and accompanying text. 
 198 See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 199 See infra Part IV. 
 200 See, e.g., Anderson v. Berghuis, No. 1:10-cv-349, 2015 WL 566619, at *18 (W.D. 
Mich. Feb. 11, 2015) (“The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has stated that cumulative error claims 
are not cognizable on habeas review.”). Notably, this strong statement has only ever been 
cited in non-capital habeas review. See infra note 203. 
 201 See Anderson, 2015 WL 566619, at *18; Brenson v. Warden, No. 2:11-CV-1146, 
2015 WL 422827, at *36 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 2, 2015); Brown v. Lafler, No. 05-72843, 2014 
WL 3752441, at *16 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2014). Time and time again, federal habeas 
petitioners in the Sixth Circuit raise cumulative error claims despite the Circuit’s excision 
of the claim from the set of cognizable claims. See Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
 202 See Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 447 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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dismiss these claims by describing their lack of merit.203 Thus, there is a 
lingering tension in the Sixth Circuit’s cumulative error jurisprudence: either 
these claims cannot be brought in federal habeas petitions full-stop; or they 
can be brought, but they will only lead to relief if they are sufficiently 
meritorious.204 
The only element of the Sixth Circuit’s cumulative error jurisprudence that 
is fairly stable is that the claim cannot be raised in federal habeas by non-
capital petitioners.205 Taking the stability of this proposition as a given, the 
Sixth Circuit’s approach to capital petitioners raising these claims is less clear. 
In Keith v. Mitchell, the Sixth Circuit panel dismissed a capital petitioner’s 
cumulative error claim because it was procedurally defaulted; however, the 
panel did not end its analysis there.206 It went on to restate that the Supreme 
Court has not held that habeas petitioners can raise cumulative error claims 
and also that the petitioner’s claim here did not warrant relief.207 
In other words, the Keith panel left open the possibility that were a 
petitioner to have a non-defaulted cumulative error claim that did warrant 
relief, it could grant that relief.208 Thus, it is possible for capital (and maybe 
noncapital209) petitioners to successfully raise cumulative error claims in the 
Sixth Circuit despite all of its suggestions to the contrary. 
                                                                                                                     
 203 See Scott, 302 F.3d at 607 (“In any event, we do not find that any errors, even when 
cumulated, denied [the petitioner] a fair trial.”); Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 557 
(6th Cir. 2000). In more recent cases, the federal district courts in the Sixth Circuit have 
denied cumulative error claims without discussing their lack of merit by noting that these 
claims are simply not cognizable in federal habeas. See supra notes 200–01. However, all 
of these cases involved non-capital habeas petitioners. Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s stance on 
capital petitioners raising cumulative error claims in federal habeas is not clear from these 
decisions. 
 204 Recent cases demonstrate the Sixth Circuit has adopted the former approach over 
the latter, but the Circuit’s appellate courts have not addressed the issue head-on since 
2006. See Bradley v. Birkett, 192 Fed. App’x 468, 480 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 205 See Davis v. Burt, 100 F.App’x 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2004). Davis was not 
recommended for publication. Thus, its precedential value is uncertain. See 6th Cir. R. 
32.1(a). The only other Sixth Circuit case addressing the issue of cumulative error claims 
raised by non-capital petitioners in habeas was also not recommended for publication. See 
Eskridge v. Konteh, 88 Fed. App’x 831, 836 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 206 Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 679 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Considering there have been no published cases directly precluding non-capital 
petitioners from raising cumulative error claims, it seems certain noncapital petitioners will 
continue to raise these claims and may find success with the right set of facts. See supra 
notes 200–01. 
992 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:4 
IV. CUMULATIVE ERROR, CAPITAL CASES, AND FEDERAL HABEAS: 
RIGHT IDEA, WRONG FORUM 
The doctrine of cumulative error in the federal habeas context is at an 
impasse. A number of the circuits allow petitioners to raise cumulative error 
claims during these collateral proceedings,210 yet another group of circuits 
prohibits them.211 More importantly, however, no circuit has granted relief to a 
petitioner solely on a claim of cumulative error.212 Further still, given that the 
AEDPA necessarily precludes a federal court from granting relief on 
cumulative error claims since the Supreme Court has not clearly permitted or 
articulated the claim,213 the claim’s obsolescence becomes apparent. 
In the capital context, cumulative error review is a great idea: taking one 
final, full look at what transpired in the state proceeding before taking 
irreversible action against a citizen is simply good practice. The conceptual 
attractiveness of cumulative error claims has fostered wild and varied 
suggestions from the legal academe.214 However, idealism has limited 
applicability in the rough world of modern federal habeas corpus.215 
A. Academic Attempts to Salvage Cumulative Error 
The continued existence of cumulative error claims in federal habeas 
petitions post-AEDPA has led to the proliferation of academic theorizing as to 
how the claim, at least structurally, can be used to promote justice and fairness 
in criminal proceedings.216 Scholars argue for the claim’s usefulness in 
promoting global reliability for all criminal cases.217 However, few of these 
academic endeavors truly reconcile the idea of cumulative claims in federal 
habeas with the reality of the AEDPA’s strictures.218 The workable academic 
suggestions that do exist use cumulative error as a structural remedy to an 
already extant habeas claim—ineffective assistance of counsel.219 However, 
cumulative error claims, on their own, cannot be vindicated in the federal 
habeas context. 
                                                                                                                     
 210 See supra Part III.A. 
 211 See supra Part III.B. 
 212 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 213 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). 
 214 See, e.g., Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1191–93; Moyer, supra note 10, at 
483–502. 
 215 See Marceau, supra note 59, at 90 (“The era of exhaustive, de novo federal habeas 
review has passed, at least for the time being, and so too must the focus of federal review 
be redirected.”). 
 216 See generally Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1191; Van Cleave, supra note 130, 
at 89–90. Van Cleave’s article was written pre-AEDPA, but its reasoning has been cited 
numerous times subsequently and will be discussed in a post-AEDPA context hereinafter. 
 217 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1188. 
 218 See supra Part II.A–B. 
 219 See Moyer, supra note 10, at 483. 
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1. Cumulative Error Theory One: A Federal Habeas  
Claim to Ensure Reliability 
Because death is different in kind than all other penalties, the need for 
reliability in capital cases is arguably greater than it is for lesser sentences.220 
Scholars point to reliability as the raison d’être for cumulative error claims to 
be reviewed in federal habeas petitions.221 Nonetheless, this line of reasoning 
misunderstands the current role of federal courts during federal habeas review, 
which is to evaluate and review the procedural mechanisms employed by the 
state judiciaries in criminal proceedings.222 
Professor Rachel Van Cleave argues that the errors alleged in all properly 
exhausted claims, excluding Fourth Amendment claims,223 ought to be 
examined in federal habeas.224 Van Cleave asserts that federal courts should 
“examine the entire record and even consider ‘prejudicial circumstances’ to 
determine” whether the alleged errors deprived a petitioner of a fair trial in 
state court.225 Further, she defines “error” broadly as “any violation of an 
objective legal rule.”226 
To be sure, Van Cleave made these assertions before the AEDPA was 
enacted.227 However, her rationale and perspective have not been entirely 
abandoned.228 
                                                                                                                     
 220 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).  
 221 Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1157 (“Our position thus relies on a link between 
verdicts’ reliability as a core aspiration and global scope of review as its measure. Seeking 
the former, one must employ the latter.”). 
 222 See Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in 
§ 2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 64–65 (2010). Federal courts 
reviewing habeas petitions by state inmates have become less concerned with the 
substantive result of the state procedures than they are with the path taken to get to that 
result. Id. 
 223 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486–87 (1976). For a full discussion of Stone 
and its impact on due process challenges in federal habeas, see generally Peter 
McCormack, Comment, Habeas Corpus and Due Process: Stone v. Powell Restricted, 17 
HOUS. L. REV. 923 (1980). 
 224 Van Cleave, supra note 130, at 89–90.  
 225 Id. at 90. 
 226 Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 n.7 (10th Cir. 1990) (en 
banc)). Van Cleave describes this definition as “broad.” Id. This description is inapt. See 
Moyer, supra note 10, at 453 n.29. More often than not, alleged errors do not violate any 
clear legal rule, but demonstrate some intrinsic unfairness such as an attorney allowing his 
client to bully him into making poor decisions or an attorney failing to investigate certain 
evidentiary leads. See, e.g., Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1088–99 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(en banc), rev’d sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
 227 See infra note 228. 
 228 There has been direct criticism of relying on pre-AEDPA scholarship in regards to 
cumulative error in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Moyer, supra note 10, at 480 
(“[P]re-AEDPA case law and scholarship arguing that federal habeas courts should apply 
the cumulative-error analysis when reviewing state court determinations fail to be 
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For their contribution to the development of cumulative error doctrine in 
federal habeas corpus, Professor John H. Blume and Christopher Seeds argue 
that the claim should be used to weed out any errors that undermine the 
reliability of a criminal sentence.229 Like Van Cleave, Blume and Seeds apply 
several procedural limitations on what errors can be cumulated.230 To preserve 
finality interests, they state that procedurally defaulted claims of error cannot 
be cumulated.231 Further, they require that the strictest standard of review of 
all the potential errors alleged ought to be used to evaluate the entire 
cumulative error assessment.232 
The relationship between Van Cleave’s approach to cumulative error and 
Blume and Seeds’s approach is in their proposed scope of review.233 They 
each argue for cumulative error review that includes every possible error that 
is procedurally permitted.234 In this way, the wide scope of review they argue 
for places a great burden on federal courts, a burden theAEDPA most certainly 
precludes.235 
The fatal flaws inherent in these theories stem from their dependence upon 
the idea that federal courts review state criminal proceedings to ensure 
reliability, especially in the capital context.236 Reliability is important, but 
finality is more important in the post-AEDPA federal habeas world.237 
                                                                                                                     
instructive.”). Nonetheless, the carryover exists. See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 
1185–86 n.117 (citing Van Cleave, supra note 130, at 62). 
 229 Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1191. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 1192. It appears that this would mean that if one of the errors required a 
petitioner to only show the existence of the error, but another error required the petitioner 
to show it was outcome-determinative, the outcome-determinative standard would apply to 
the whole cumulative assessment. Id. at 1192–93 n.132. However, Blume and Seeds state 
clearly the standard would be whether the cumulative errors “present a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome.” Id. at 1192. Deciphering these mixed messages is not 
relevant to the analysis of their approach for the purposes of this Note. 
 233 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1191; Van Cleave, supra note 130, at 90. 
 234 Compare Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1191, with Van Cleave, supra note 130, 
at 90. Blume and Seeds go so far as to say both record-based and non-record-based errors 
ought to be considered. See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1191. 
 235 For one, the Supreme Court has rejected Blume and Seeds’s contention that non-
record-based errors ought to be reviewed in federal habeas. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 
S. Ct. 1388, 1400 (2011) (noting that new evidence that was not part of the original state 
court record has “no bearing” on federal review of the state court’s decision). Further, the 
claims that are cognizable in federal habeas are entirely dependent upon the Supreme 
Court’s stating so. See supra note 185. Thus, the scope of reviewable errors is much more 
narrow than asserted by Blume and Seeds as well as Van Cleave. 
 236 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1192–93 (“This approach . . . furthers the 
Court’s constitutional value of choice, ‘reliability,’ . . . .”). 
 237 See supra Part II.A–B. 
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2. Cumulative Error Theory Two: A Structural Model  
for Other Habeas Claims 
Since the enactment of the AEDPA, scholars have argued for the adoption 
of cumulative error not as a claim in and of itself, but as a structural archetype 
to be incorporated in another common federal habeas claim: ineffective 
assistance of counsel or Strickland claims.238 There is much to be said in 
support of this argument both from precedent and from its intuitive logic.239 
Nonetheless, cumulating attorney errors for purposes of evaluating Strickland 
claims has only an analogous relationship to cumulative error claims as stand-
alone global reliability assessments.240 Thus, the vein of scholarship stands 
apart from the more general understanding of cumulative error claims on their 
own. 
In Kyles v. Whitley, the Supreme Court incorporated the structure of 
cumulative error claims into its Brady error doctrine.241 The Court held that 
“suppressed evidence [must be] considered collectively, not item by item.”242 
The Court reasoned that consideration of the net effect of unconstitutionally 
suppressed evidence would have a measurable effect on a jury’s verdict in 
comparison to the jury considering each piece of suppressed evidence in 
isolation.243 
Following Kyles, it seemed as though the Supreme Court would inevitably 
hold that attorney errors must be viewed together when courts review 
Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claims.244 However, despite many 
suggestions that a clear decision to this effect was imminent, no such decision 
has been made.245 
Consequently, numerous scholars have argued that attorney errors must be 
cumulated in evaluating Strickland claims.246 As noted, this conclusion seems 
                                                                                                                     
 238 See, e.g., Moyer, supra note 10, at 483. 
 239 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1180–83. 
 240 That is, wholesale review of the entire set of potential errors that may have 
undermined a criminal conviction or sentence is a separate inquiry entirely from whether or 
not multiple attorney errors ought to be considered together or separately. 
 241 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995). 
 242 Id. at 436. 
 243 Id. at 437. This holding was reinforced by Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698 
(2004). 
 244 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1169. 
 245 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683 (1985) (citing Strickland as support 
for the considering the cumulative effect of the undisclosed evidence); see also Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536 (2003) (noting that ineffective assistance of error claims require a 
court to “evaluate the totality of the evidence—‘both that adduced at trial, and the evidence 
adduced in the habeas proceeding[s]’” (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 362, 397–98 (2000))). 
 246 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 97, at 1171 (“This point ought not be controversial: 
errors in defense counsel’s performance should be cumulated in the Strickland prejudice 
prong.”); Moyer, supra note 10, at 483 (“The Supreme Court should resolve the current 
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constitutionally correct. Further, given the Court’s recent ineffective assistance 
jurisprudence, it seems that it would be open to expressly holding as such 
soon.247 Still, such a decision would have little, if any, effect on cumulative 
error claims as viable habeas claims on their own. 
3. Cumulative Error Theory Three: Shifting the Burden to the State 
One last proposition has struck close to the heart of the tension between 
cumulative error claims and state death sentences: the Supreme Court should 
readopt the higher harmless error review standard articulated in Chapman v. 
California248 for state death row inmates arguing mitigation error in federal 
habeas.249 This argument uses the “death is different” rationale to reconfigure 
cumulative error so that it provides meaningful review for inmates condemned 
to die.250 
Despite the superficial appeal of this argument, it is only half-baked. First, 
if the Supreme Court were to adopt the “harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt”251 standard for mitigation errors, which would place the burden on the 
prosecution to prove that the errors that occurred were in fact without effect, it 
would be implicitly leaving death row inmates raising culpability phase claims 
without an avenue for relief. In this way, heightening the harmless error 
standard for mitigation errors would not only be too narrow—it would be 
harmfully exclusive. 
Second, scholars supporting this jurisprudential move in order to ensure 
the reliability of capital sentences would have to ignore the severe deference 
the AEDPA requires federal courts to give to state courts.252 Ryan C. Thomas, 
the main proponent of this argument, contends that the limited applicability of 
                                                                                                                     
circuit split concerning the cumulation of Strickland errors and hold that courts may 
cumulate an attorney’s errors in order to determine if Strickland prejudice exists.”); 
Michael C. McLaughlin, Note, It Adds Up: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Cumulative Deficiency Doctrine, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 879 (2014) (“At the first 
available opportunity, the Supreme Court should grant a certiorari petition in order to 
resolve the circuit split over whether the prejudice arising from multiple errors by defense 
counsel should be cumulated to determine whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
under the Strickland v. Washington standard.”); Eric O’Brien, Note, Jennings v. Stephens 
and Judicial Efficiency in Habeas Appeals, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 
21, 35 (2015) (“The Court should rule . . . that ineffective assistance of counsel is a single 
claim with a deficient performance prong and a cumulative prejudice prong . . . .”). 
 247 See generally Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 
S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
 248 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
 249 See Thomas, supra note 106, at 516. 
 250 See id. at 552; see also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998–99 (1983) (“The 
Court, as well as the separate opinions of a majority of the individual Justices, has 
recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a 
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.”). 
 251 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
 252 See supra Part II.A–B. 
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this review inoculates it from the AEDPA’s focus on finality and deference.253 
However, limited applicability only addresses finality and does not impact the 
AEDPA’s stringent deference requirements. Sure, only a subset of a subset of 
federal habeas cases will be impacted by this rule (death row inmates with 
mitigation error claims); however, even for that limited group, the federal 
court will have to defer to the state court’s ruling on the matter.254 In this way, 
federal courts will not be truly applying the Chapman standard to mitigation 
errors for death row inmates—state courts will.255 The federal courts will only 
be there to reaffirm that the state courts did not act unreasonably.256 
If the AEDPA could be ignored or worked around, perhaps this argument 
would have greater appeal. However, given the new rules of federal habeas, 
this approach effectively only reframes the analysis for the state courts and 
does little, if anything, to provide relief in federal court. 
4. The Future of Cumulative Error in Federal Habeas 
Federal habeas review of cumulative error claims, in the abstract, is ideal 
for ensuring the reliability of state criminal convictions and sentences.257 In 
addition, it is beyond dispute that consideration of multiple errors of the same 
kind separately, as opposed to considering them collectively unfairly 
diminishes their cumulative significance.258 
However, the unsteady and unguided development of cumulative error 
claims in federal habeas has precluded a unified doctrine.259 Further, even with 
doctrinal discrepancies across the circuits, the trend is clear: cumulative error 
claims do not lead to habeas relief on their own.260 
Still, cumulative error can serve a valuable, necessary purpose in the 
context of capital cases where reliability takes on heightened significance.261 
The problem is, given the AEDPA and its Supreme Court progeny,262 
cumulative error as an independent federal habeas claim is ineffective.263 
Consequently, it ought to be removed from federal habeas jurisprudence and 
reintroduced as a mandatory state collateral review procedure. 
                                                                                                                     
 253 Thomas, supra note 106, at 551–54. 
 254 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 See supra Part II.C. 
 258 See infra Part IV.B; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 n.10 (1995). 
 259 Compare supra Part III.A, with supra Part III.B. 
 260 See supra Part III. 
 261 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on 
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 
370–71 (1995). 
 262 See supra Part II.A–B. 
 263 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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B. Necessary Trouble: Reimagining Cumulative Error as  
a State Procedure 
So long as state and federal legislatures continue to support capital 
punishment, those inmates sentenced to death will continue to seek avenues 
for relief.264 While some condemned prisoners will have received fair 
procedures, others will not have.265 In order to ensure that no person is 
executed as a result of fundamentally unfair procedures, some systematic 
reliability check or error-review mechanism needs to be in place.266 
Cumulative error claims in federal habeas corpus petitions have been an 
ineffective, but important, symbolic stopgap.267 Although these claims have 
never led to relief on their own, their existence suggests that courts are aware 
that reviewing what occurred below in the aggregate is important to maintain 
fundamentally fair procedures.268 However, given that cumulative error claims 
are so futile in federal habeas petitions, their actual capacity to review and 
check the fairness of the criminal procedures leading to a death sentence is de 
minimis.269 
1. Selecting the Proper Channel for Change:  
The Legislature or the Court? 
Fortunately, a simple reconfiguration of cumulative error can save it from 
its current hapless state, which will, in turn, ensure that it can truly function as 
a reliability check for capital sentences. Rather than using cumulative error as 
a claim in federal habeas petitions, cumulative error ought to be reimagined as 
a mandatory state procedure wherein potential errors that may have 
undermined the fundamental fairness of the capital trial are examined at the 
state-level first. 
This transformation of cumulative error can be undertaken in one of two 
ways. The first option is federal legislation. Congress could enact legislation 
that incentivizes adopting these additional procedures. A good starting place 
would be using the accelerated the AEDPA “opt-in” mechanism.270 Congress 
                                                                                                                     
 264 See FRANKL, supra note 38, at 28. 
 265 See, e.g., Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1088–92 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), 
rev’d sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
 266 See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487 n.15 (1978); Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973). 
 267 See supra Parts II.C, III. 
 268 See supra Part III. 
 269 See, e.g., Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091–92. 
 270 See DOYLE, supra note 5, at 8–11. The AEDPA permits states that provide 
mechanisms for appointing and compensating counsel for indigent death row inmates 
during their state collateral appeals to take advantage of streamlined and expedited federal 
habeas procedures. 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b)–(c) (2012). As it stands, only three states have 
attempted to “opt-in” and none have succeeded. See Jennifer Ponder, The Attorney 
General’s Power of Certification Regarding State Mechanisms to Opt-in to Streamlined 
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could amend the AEDPA’s opt-in procedures to allow states that adopt 
cumulative error review procedures easier paths to opting-in.271 However, this 
approach is less than ideal. 
Ignoring the practical difficulties of passing substantial legislation, 
congressional incentives are inherently less effective then federal mandates.272 
Further, Congress cannot pass a federal mandate requiring additional state 
criminal procedures in the same way it can create mandates in other arenas.273 
Thus, at best, Congress can suggest states act in a certain way; however, that 
suggestion will likely go unheeded.274 
The second option is a Supreme Court decision. The United States 
Supreme Court could grant certiorari to a federal habeas corpus appeal 
involving a state death row inmate raising a cumulative error claim, 
definitively remove the claim from federal habeas corpus petitions, and require 
state courts or legislature to develop cumulative error review protocols. 
In so doing, the Court would remedy two of the major problems with the 
cumulative error doctrine in its current state. First, the Court’s direct decision 
on the issue of cumulative error claims in federal habeas corpus petitions 
raised by state death row inmates would establish the clear precedent the 
AEDPA requires in order to have federal courts determine if state courts acted 
reasonably.275 This would, in effect, eliminate the wide disparity amongst the 
circuits on the issue of cumulative error while also giving necessary guidance 
on the claim itself.276 Second, if the Court decided this issue in the way 
described above (removing cumulative error from federal habeas corpus and 
reconfiguring it as a state procedure), the claim would be able to serve its 
intended function—error-detection and review.277 
While it is easy to critique any proposed solution that involves the 
Supreme Court both granting certiorari and deciding a case in a specified 
manner, this particular solution stands apart for three reasons. First, the 
                                                                                                                     
Habeas Corpus Procedure, 6 AM. U. CRIM. L. BRIEF 38, 41 (2010), http://digitalcommons. 
wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=clb [http://perma.cc/CF3M-5BUJ]. 
 271 The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 made opting in 
easier by eliminating some of the counsel requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2265(b) and 
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Attorney General. See DOYLE, supra note 5, at 11; Ponder, supra note 270, at 41. Congress 
would simply have further amend 28 U.S.C. § 2265(b). 
 272 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) 
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 273 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). For a general discussion of the limits of Congress’s 
power in the arena of state criminal law, see Jason A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 385–91 (2012). 
 274 See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 275 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also supra Parts II.C, III. 
 276 See, e.g., Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 679 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 277 See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487 n.15 (1978); Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973). 
1000 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:4 
problem it addresses can only effectively be addressed by a Supreme Court 
decision given the AEDPA restrictions.278 Second, the proposed solution is 
neither radical nor impracticable; it is necessary and designed to make the 
criminal justice system as a whole more workable than it is currently. Third, 
the proposed solution involves a reduction in federal court traffic while giving 
more responsibility and deference to state criminal procedures just as the 
AEDPA intended.279 
2. State Cumulative Error Review as the Essential Pre-Federal Habeas 
Procedure for State Death Row Inmates 
A Supreme Court decision addressing cumulative error claims in the 
federal habeas context head-on would go a long way to shoring up the claims’ 
legitimacy and efficacy.280 But, it is not enough that the Supreme Court take 
up the claim and elaborate on it. To save the claim, the Supreme Court must 
transform it from an ad hoc federal habeas claim281 to a state pre-federal 
habeas procedure. 
For state death row inmates, ensuring that each potential or actual error is 
given due consideration before their sentences are executed is of paramount 
importance.282 For federal courts under the AEDPA, deference to state courts 
and finality are the ball game.283 Reconciling these two important perspectives 
can be achieved by refashioning cumulative error as a state procedure. 
In the current federal habeas climate, even robust claims such as Brady 
claims can appear meek and ineffectual in federal courts given the AEDPA’s 
ever-constricting procedural hurdles.284 Given this reality, it is no grand 
surprise that an extemporized, last-ditch claim like a cumulative error claim 
has no traction in federal court.285 Yet, cumulative error claims remain 
attractive both for petitioners and for federal judiciaries, at least at the 
outset,286 because they point out the poignant reality that criminal justice is a 
singularly human endeavor bound to contain all manner of mistakes, missteps, 
                                                                                                                     
 278 See supra Part II.A–B. 
 279 See supra Part II.A–B. 
 280 See, e.g., Keith, 455 F.3d at 679. 
 281 See supra Parts II.C, III. 
 282 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 283 See Marceau, supra note 59, at 110–13. 
 284 See id. at 113 (“The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was little doubt ‘[the 
petitioner’s] Brady rights were violated’ but nonetheless held that, because federal review 
is constrained by § 2254(d), the petitioner was not ‘entitled to habeas relief.’” (quoting 
Valdovinos v. McGrath, 423 F. App’x 720, 722–23 (9th Cir. 2011))). 
 285 See supra Part III. 
 286 See supra Part III.A (noting that a number of circuits at least allow petitioners to 
raise cumulative error claims). 
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and miscues.287 Introducing cumulative error into state post-conviction 
procedures allows courts (albeit state courts) to take advantage of the attractive 
qualities of the claim—robust error-detection and increased reliability of the 
entire criminal justice system—without running afoul of the AEDPA. In fact, 
this reimagining of cumulative error would fall precisely in line with the 
AEDPA’s guiding principles: finality and deference to the states.288 
After determining that cumulative error claims must be addressed by the 
states, the next logistical issue is determining at what stage of the criminal 
process should these claims be reviewed.289 Requiring this review to be 
conducted on direct appellate review has two key advantages: direct review is 
mandatory and indigent criminal defendants must be afforded constitutionally 
effective counsel.290 However, direct appeal suffers from a limited scope of 
review as appellants usually can only raise claims based upon the record 
before the trial court.291 
The other state-court option is post-conviction proceedings also referred to 
as state habeas or initial collateral review.292 This avenue has its own set of 
advantages and drawbacks. On the plus side of the ledger, state post-
conviction allows criminal defendants to raise claims based on an expanded 
record not limited to the record before the trial court.293 This expansive look at 
what transpired is especially useful for cumulative error claims, which depend 
upon all the errors that may or may not have occurred, not a subset of those 
errors.294 However, the downside of requiring cumulative error to be raised in 
state post-conviction proceedings is dispositive here: in state post-conviction, 
there is no constitutional right to counsel.295 Given that a state death row 
inmate behind bars is, to put it lightly, ill-positioned to conduct a serious fact-
                                                                                                                     
 287 James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in the Criminal Justice System: Sentinel 
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 288 See supra Part II.A–B. 
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intensive investigation pro se,296 the costs of having cumulative error raised in 
state post-conviction outweigh the benefits. 
Having considered the two traditional avenues for state appellate review, it 
seems neither is suitable for cumulative error review. While this is 
unfortunate, it is sensible: on direct review, death row inmates have counsel, 
but a limited source of evidence; on collateral review, they theoretically have 
unlimited evidence, but no counsel.297 Neither of these kinds of review fit 
cumulative error claims well because cumulative error claims require a court 
to conduct comprehensive review as opposed to claim-by-claim evaluations—
a totalizing kind of review that requires both evidence outside the trial record 
and effective counsel.298 
Unlike these traditional kinds of state appellate review, cumulative error 
claims charge a reviewing court with the task of ensuring that in light of the 
mistakes that have occurred, the entire criminal process and the ultimate result 
are fundamentally fair.299 Cumulative error is not concerned with a single 
problem or a single claim; it is a question of the net effect of multiple errors, 
and whether, in the aggregate, those errors cast doubt upon the legitimacy of 
the process or the outcome.300 In this way, cumulative error should be 
constructed as a state procedure not a state claim. That is, cumulative error 
ought to be a mandatory mechanism or protocol that states develop and use to 
self-evaluate. 
Ideally, cumulative error will be a state procedure that is defined not by 
what appeal or process it comes after, but by what appeal it comes before: 
federal habeas corpus. In this posture, states will have the opportunity to 
conduct a comprehensive review that may (but probably will not) eliminate a 
number of federal habeas petitions. This posture is ideal because it is 
undeveloped. Currently, there is no constitutional guidance as to whether pre-
federal habeas review requires counsel or not, or whether such review is 
limited to trial record or not. Importantly, however, this posture gives 
structural and substantive deference to the states because they will have the 
opportunity to screen cases before they become federal habeas cases.301 
In order to ensure that the state procedures leading to a death sentence are 
fundamentally fair, a thorough review of all the available evidence should be 
undertaken.302 But, this review must stand apart from the current state 
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appellate processes where adversaries are not predisposed to admit fault or 
error.303 Further, judges ought not be the sole arbiters of whether the 
underlying criminal proceedings were fundamentally fair.304 
James Doyle, a Visiting Fellow at the National Institute of Justice from 
2012 to 2014, argues that the United States criminal justice systems lack 
procedures to account for “unintended tragic outcomes, to learn lessons 
from . . . errors, and to use these lessons to reduce future risks.”305 Doyle 
contends that unlike other “high-risk enterprises” America’s criminal justice 
systems fail to provide “sentinel event reviews,” which are comprehensive 
reviews of potential structural weaknesses that indicate significant, unexpected 
negative outcomes.306 Doyle notes that in other fields like medicine and 
aviation these reviews are focused on reducing future risk not assigning 
blame.307 In this way, sentinel event reviews are untaken “with all system 
stakeholders working together in a nonblaming review.”308 
Doyle’s sentinel event review model ought to be the framework by which 
cumulative error as a pre-federal habeas state procedure is shaped. This model 
acknowledges that errors that lead to wrongful convictions or improper 
                                                                                                                     
examine all possible sources of error and determine if, in light of those missteps, errors, or 
blatant wrongdoings, a criminal conviction ought to be sustained or a specific punishment 
ought to be imposed. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S 478, 487 n.15 (1978) (stating that 
“the cumulative effect of the potentially damaging circumstances of this case violated the 
due process guarantee of fundamental fairness”). Due process and fundamental fairness are 
not “technical conception[s] with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances.” Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). It 
is inherently context-dependent and requires an examination of the particular facts and 
circumstances of a given case. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 
U.S. 18, 32 (1981). 
 303 See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and 
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1319 (1978) (“[A]dversarial 
investigation . . . enables counsel to play the games of deception, concealment, and 
manipulation that defeat the purposes discovery was intended to serve.”). It should be 
noted that while Brazil focuses on civil litigation and we often conceptualize the death 
penalty as a purely criminal topic, post-conviction procedures as well as federal habeas are, 
by definition, civil not criminal procedures. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423–24 (1963), 
overruled on other grounds by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). For a 
different take on the problems with the adversarial process and ensuring fundamental 
fairness, see Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of 
Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 644–47 (2002). 
 304 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 355–56 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (criticizing the Court’s “actual innocence” doctrine for requiring federal 
courts “unnaturally, to ‘function in much the same capacity as the state trier of fact’; that is, 
to ‘make a rough decision on the question of guilt or innocence’” (quoting Kuhlmann v. 
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 471 n.7 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting))). 
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sentences are products of organizational accidents not individual errors.309 As 
Doyle notes: 
No single error can cause an organizational accident independently; the 
errors of many individuals (“active errors”) converge and interact with system 
weaknesses (“latent conditions”), increasing the likelihood that individual 
errors will do harm. The practitioners and organizations involved in 
[wrongful convictions or improper sentences] do not choose to make errors. 
These events involved normal people, doing normal work, in normal 
organizations, and they suffer . . . “normal accidents.” Like the Challenger 
launch decision, the outcomes reflect “mistake[s] embedded in the banality of 
organizational life.”310 
In this way, this pre-federal habeas procedure should allow the states to 
ferret out mistakes and errors that should not have contributed to what could 
be a permanent, preventable harm: the execution of a human being. 
Consequently, in keeping with Doyle’s sentinel event review model, this 
pre-federal habeas state procedure should involve all of the key stakeholders in 
the criminal justice system: prosecutors, defense counselors, judges, victim 
advocates, and the like.311 The goal of this process should be to prevent 
preventable tragedies, not to point fingers.312 Thus, involving all of the 
stakeholders, perhaps excluding those parties directly involved in the litigation 
below to preserve objectivity and ward off any potential conflicts of interest, 
will allow cumulative error’s true purpose to be achievable and effective. 
Of course, this approach is idyllic. It is also challenging. It requires a lot of 
effort from the states who have elected to keep and use capital punishment. 
But, the safeguards it affords are necessary. 
Death is different in kind from every other punishment.313 Consequently, 
different—even costly—protective measures are absolutely necessary to 
ensure this ultimate punishment is imposed fairly. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The AEDPA has refocused federal courts to ensure that states are the 
ultimate substantive arbiters of their own criminal processes.314 It has forced 
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federal courts to punt the brunt of the constitutional review process to state 
courts leaving the former only to check on the procedures of the latter.315 
In the ten years since the AEDPA was enacted, scholars have debated 
whether its restrictions would be more hype than bite.316 However, recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence coupled with the AEDPA’s application 
throughout the federal circuits has shown its restrictions to be anything but 
nominal.317 In this constricting context, federal courts have been forced to 
defer to troubling state court rulings even when they wished to rule 
otherwise.318 
The turmoil following the AEDPA’s passage and subsequent application 
has, surprisingly, left cumulative error as a federal habeas claim largely 
intact.319 Although the claim is entirely symbolic, it continues to be raised 
time and time again.320 The inefficacy of cumulative error claims is not a 
consequence of perfect state procedures,321 but a necessary result of 
incomplete doctrine in an inhospitable environment. 
Cumulative error claims no longer belong in federal habeas corpus.322 
Ideally, they will be reconfigured as a pre-federal habeas state procedure 
involving multiple stakeholders in the criminal justice system as a whole 
specifically for cases wherein a person has been sentenced to death.323 Short of 
this, the Supreme Court should do something with cumulative error lest it 
wallow away in the muck and confusion of the federal circuits, dying a slow 
death.324 
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